research altogether (Slater, 2006, p. 751) , Lees asks us What is the point of a substantial, critical, and vigorous academic literature on gentrifi cation if it is not actually disseminated to those in a position to infl uence and make the policies we seek to inform? (Lees, 2003, p. 573 ).
The resurfacing debate on relevance in geography in general (for example, Pacione, 1999; Massey, 2000 Massey, , 2001 Massey, , 2002 Martin, 2001 Martin, , 2002 Dorling and Shaw, 2002; Imrie, 2004; Beaumont et al. 2005; Ward, 2005; Pain, 2006) has equally struggled with the dilemma of either having to sell one's critical soul to the devil and get access to government and its allied institutions, or remain distant from the state but at the same time without impact. However, in recent contributions, the debate has moved to a more nuanced level of reasoning (Blanc, 2000; Massey, 2002; Imrie, 2004; Beaumont et al., 2005; Ward, 2005; Pain, 2006) . These latter contributors argue that producing policy-relevant research goes well beyond working with or for policy-makers. Questioning whether getting the minister's ear is always the most effective route to affect policy-making, they set out to analyse how more diverse 'spaces of relevance' (Beaumont et al., 2005) can be deployed. The question, Imrie (2004) argues, is not so much whether or not geographers (or, in our present case, gentrifi cation researchers) should strive for policy relevance, but how and by which strategies they can do so. Imrie (2004) , Beaumont et al. (2005) as well as Pain (2006) emphasise the importance of an analysis of the political and social context in which policy research takes place, to be able to exploit fully the spaces of relevance at hand. This presupposes an active engagement of the researcher that goes far beyond the delivery of research reports to authorities and writing academic journal articles. To enhance relevance, Beaumont et al. argue that interstices must be sought by researchers to mobilize support, establish a fi rm institutional basis and advance critical claims that may or may not tally with those of the authorities (Beaumont et al., 2005, p. 124) .
Repeatedly, gentrifi cation researchers have been called to arms to take policy seriously in understanding the form, scale and scope of gentrifi cation (van Weesep, 1994; Lees, 2000) but so far there have been only few explicit attempts in this direction (for example, Hammel, 1999, 2001; Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Slater, 2004; Uitermark et al., 2007) and, with some notable exceptions (in particular Uitermark et al., 2007 , who strongly emphasise the governmental and institutional dimension to explain state-led gentrifi cation), the (local) state continues to be treated as a Black box whose internal processes deserve little or no investigation.
In this paper, I will take up Lees' (2000) challenge to take a closer look at particular urban regeneration policies and the representations and discourses on gentrifi cation that fi gure in it. I argue that, to understand the spaces of relevance available to gentrifi cation researchers in a context of state-led gentrification in a particular city, it is fi rst of all necessary to analyse how and why the state has come to take an interest in gentrifi cation as public policy.
Using a neo-Gramscian state-theoretical framework, I analyse how in Antwerp (Belgium) gentrifi cation has become a core element for the establishment of a new hegemony in urban policy. Seen from this perspective, it is clear that gentrification policy does not appear out of the blue, on the demand of particular actors external to the local state. Instead, it reveals itself as the historical and contingent outcome of a series of attempts to match the interests and goals of various local actors and groups and develop a common rationale for urban development both inside and outside the local state. This process started after the crumbling of modernist hegemony in the 1970s, when a counter-hegemonic discourse appeared revolving around the concept of liveability, to which gentrifi cation appears as the-belated and probably still provisional-answer.
The paper begins with a discussion of how neo-Gramscian political theory might enhance our understanding of the historical and geographical particularities of the interplay between urban policy and gentrification. The analytical framework developed is then applied to the case of Antwerp, Belgium. In the conclusion, I explore what this analysis teaches us in relation to the possible strategies and tactics for enhancing policy relevance in critical gentrifi cation research.
Hegemony and Strategic Selectivity
One of the most innovative and infl uential ideas in Gramsci's political theory is his concept of hegemony. Hegemony, in Gramsci's writings, has come to mean various things, but for the purpose of our analysis, two dimensions of it appear crucially important. First of all, Gramsci introduced the concept of hegemony to capture the ideological predominance of bourgeois values and norms over the subordinate classes (Carnoy, 1984) . Hegemony allows dominant social groups to rule by consent rather than coercion. It is the situation whereby rule in the interest of a dominant social group is seen as legitimate by subordinate classes or groups because this particular interest is presented (and accepted) as equal to or at least supportive of the 'general interest' . Ives (2004) points to the role of ideology in hegemony when explaining how the concept of hegemony expands the defi nition of politics from the direct activities of government and operations of state power to questions of how people come to understand the world. Hegemony exists because those social groups whose interests are not furthered by the ruling constellation, lack their own coherent framework to understand the world and their position in the world, and necessarily fall back upon ideas and concepts offered to them by the hegemonic social group.
Secondly, Gramsci uses the concept of historical bloc to emphasise the functionality of hegemony as a means of co-ordination. A historical bloc refers to an alliance of different forces, organisations and actors-of both structure and superstructure-at various scales (Jessop, 2005, p. 425) organised around a hegemonic set of ideas that give strategic direction and coherence to their collaborative efforts. For a historical bloc to emerge, its core organisation must engage in a hegemonic project, a "conscious planned struggle for hegemony" (Gill, 2003, p. 58; Jessop, 1997, p. 62) which involves both the active search for compromises, shared interests, common goals, and institutional links among the organisations and groups of the historical bloc (Gramsci, 1975 (Gramsci, /2001 (Gramsci, , pp. 1612 (Gramsci, -1613 and the development of a common, congruent discourse to win the hearts and minds of the general public.
However, in a diverse society with a variety of different and opposing interests, a historical bloc cannot achieve full closure and hegemony is always potentially unstable. There is always the risk that counter-hegemonic discourses are produced by social groups whose interests are not furthered by the operations of the members of the historical bloc, or that coordination of the historical bloc fails as members no longer believe its co-ordinating set of ideas appropriately furthers their interests. When the historical bloc comes under duress or when counter-hegemonic discourses gain infl uence in civil society, consent is no longer the prevailing feature of rule and a phase of hegemony is alternated with non-hegemony (Cox, 1983, p. 135) , as Gramsci observed in most European countries after the First World War (Gramsci, 1975 (Gramsci, /2001 (Gramsci, , p. 1638 . Jessop (1990 Jessop ( , 2002a adds that the struggle over hegemony is fought on a strategically selective terrain of existing discourses, organisational and structural relations resulting from earlier struggles. This terrain makes some strategies and discourses more viable than others and lends to the sequence of hegemonic and non-hegemonic phases a path-dependent and place-specifi c character (Jessop, 2002a, p. 34) . A crucial factor of selectivity, according to Gramsci, is the state of hegemony or non-hegemony: Gramsci argues how countervailing forces seeking to take over state power or reorient state policies should not engage in a head-on attack against the hegemony of a historical bloc, deploying a military metaphor a 'war of manoeuvre', but require, fi rst, a 'war of position' to develop a coherent alternative world-view, to forge alliances and networks among different groups in civil society and to undermine existing hegemony (Ives, 2004, pp. 107-109) . Only if hegemony falls apart, and a period of non-hegemony starts, do opportunities appear for alternative projects to infl uence state policies.
In the following section, I will analyse how gentrifi cation became the ideological focus of a local hegemonic project for urban development in Antwerp. The above theoretical discussion provides us with a framework for this analysis. It suggests how alternating periods of hegemony and non-hegemony can be detected, and suggests that these develop in a path-dependent manner. It suggests that the establishment of hegemony requires a project that secures both legitimacy with the wider public and co-ordination of relevant actors within and without the state apparatus, whereas non-hegemony can result from problems of either legitimacy or co-ordination, or both at the same time.
Central elements to the analysis of this history of urban development are the discursive and organisational actions of organisations attempting to occupy a central and steering role in the development of a hegemonic project. Which discourses are produced and which alliances are formed are key questions to establish a periodisation of hegemonic projects (not necessarily all successful in establishing hegemony) leading to the current phase of gentrifi cation policies (Jessop, 2002b) . This framework of analysis is then applied to the involvement of local government in Antwerp in a hegemonic project focusing on gentrifi cation, which can be traced back to the contradictions of modernism which surfaced in the 1960s, and is the temporary end-phase of a four-stage local search for answers to these problems (see Table 1 ).
In a fi rst phase, we witness the collapse of modernist hegemony as it faces both legitimacy and co-ordination crises, leading to a period of non-hegemony. In a fi rst phase of non-hegemony, a shattered historical bloc is not able to provide any answers and counterhegemonic discourses gain more prominence; but practical experiments by various organisations do not succeed in reconciling the problems of legitimacy and co-ordination. In a second phase of non-hegemony, the local and regional state take a stronger lead, having developed an internal consensus over the direction to take, but they do not succeed in convincing civil society. From this follows a last phase of state-supported gentrifi cation that, I contend, is thus far the most successful hegemonic project in that it responds to both the issues of legitimacy and co-ordination, which had troubled the modernist project.
Urban Policy Programmes and Hegemony in Antwerp
The Last Convulsions of Modernism: Cataclysmic Phase, 1971-83
Antwerp, a medium-sized city with a population of 460 000 and home to one of Europe's largest ports, lies in the highly urbanised north-west European core area between separation and the promise of light, air and space (see the collection of papers in van Herck and Avermaete, 2006; in particular de Meulder, 2006) . The old, often medieval townhouses, were relegated-literally-to a folkloric museum. Modernist renewal was the pride of the city. In one of its promotional publications of the time, the city heralded that Antwerp is growing in a really American rhythm. In its centre the old houses are being pulled down by hundreds, in order to make place for high fl at buildings. To the South (Kiel) and to the North (Luchtbal) there are still vast and fallow lying areas enabling a bolder town-planning on a larger scale. More and more new modern residential quarters are silhouetted against the sky (Publiservice, 1957, p. 31) .
For quite some time, modernism as an ideology of urban development succeeded in providing both a degree of co-ordination between the main actors involved and strong legitimacy among the Antwerp citizenry.
However, this hegemony eroded-as in many Western cities-by the end of the 1960s when previously silenced subaltern voices joined in a counter-hegemonic attack. Conservationists bemoaned the rapid destruction of historical monuments; progressive intellectuals and artists wanted to revamp the underground spirit of the city; feminist activists reclaimed city streets and public spaces, monopolized by traffi c, for their children; and local shopkeeper organisations who annually lost clients through the undermining of the housing function in the centre mobilised for inner-city living. All these social forces heavily contested the modernist renewal processes (de Smit, 2003; Verschueren, 2003, p. 165; Buyck, 1988) . Under the common fl ag of 'liveability' they reclaimed the city for its inhabitants; they fi rmly advanced their claims for a maximisation of the city's 'use value' against the exchange value realised for London, Paris and the Ruhr. It has a particularly large medieval core of about 10 square km and an inner ring of densely built up, 19th-century working-class neighbourhoods (Figure 1 ). Its early 20th-century inner suburbs are largely contained within the administrative border of the city, but the city is in a highly competitive position with the wealthy autonomous municipalities of its post-war suburbs, where another half a million commuters to the city reside.
As a major port city, Antwerp has long had a strong working-class character and ever since 1933-with the exception of the war years-Antwerp has been governed by a socialist mayor. Profi ting from the fl ourishing of its port, socialist mayors Huysmans and Craeybeckx (1946-76) , under the ideological infl uence of local modernist architects Renaat Braem, Leon Stynen and Henry van de Velde would give Antwerp, compared with other Belgian cities, an impressive modernist make-over (Toubhans and Lombaerde, 1993) . After the Second World War in particular, slums were cleared at unprecedented rates. In the medieval inner city, 3500 houses, or about 35 per cent of the existing housing stock, were demolished and replaced by offices, thoroughfares, public spaces or social housing. At the same time, high-rise social housing was created in the periphery, between 1953 and 1973 at a rate of about 1000 units per year (Ceuppens, 1981) . The modernist ideology served to co-ordinate the collaborative effort of construction fi rms, landowners (in the periphery) and the local state-operating as a collective consumerwhile the national state and private service companies also invested in replacing the dilapidated inner-city housing stock with offi ces for a growing service economy.
The depressing housing situation in the inner city and the post-war housing shortage, as well as the economic optimism of the time, also stimulated widespread popular support for the modernist ideas of functional Their concerns were taken up fi rst by a local non-governmental planning organ 'ScheldeDijle vzw' in a report on the inner city (Schelde-Dijle vzw, 1971) . When in 1971 one of its members (Bob Cools) was appointed alderman for spatial planning in Antwerp (the fi rst ever in Belgium), these ideas also entered the offi cial urban planning discourse (see Stad Antwerpen, 1973) . However, they did not spread widely: spatial planning was still a marginal practice in Belgium at the time (see Dutt and Costa, 1992) , which had little infl uence on wider politics. In his memoirs, Cools (1994) describes how the department of public works, which followed an entirely different logic than the urban planners, took the decisions on construction permits. When in the 1970s real estate investors discovered the newly emerging rental offi ce market in Antwerp, they had few diffi culties in obtaining new construction permits, even if monuments or residential quarters needed to be razed. Under fi erce protest from the population, and against the ideas propagated by the planning department, high-rise office development experienced a golden age in the central city and further increased the growth of the CBD (Sanders, 1986) .
On the other hand, the city experienced, particularly at the end of the 1970s, a period of fi nancial hardship due to the continuation of the economic crisis. Although the planning department created several plans for the revitalisation of inner-city neighbourhoods (Stad Antwerpen, 1973 ,,1978 , 1980 , experimenting with citizen participation and new concepts, little was realised in practice: it became increasingly difficult to find public funding for the execution of the plans. In 1983, after a particularly diffi cult amalgamation process with surrounding municipalities, central government imposed rigorous fi nancial constraints upon the city. Antwerp modernism received its fi nal blow: the city was not even allowed to make any major investments anymore until all its debts had been discharged (expected, at best, for 2012). The close alliance between construction companies and the city that had made possible the rapid modernisation of large parts of the city was shattered. All the while, a decade of fi erce popular protests against an unwilling local government had ruined the relations between the city and its activist citizens, which, according to the then mayor Cools (1994, p. 141) resembled a regular trench war.
From this, it is clear how modernist hegemony came into trouble fi rst because the modernist discourse stopped finding legitimacy for its practices among the wider public. The main focus of critique was that it failed to guarantee the liveability of the city for its residents. The claims for a liveable inner city then also troubled co-ordination practices as, at the time, they ran counter to the strategies of construction fi rms seeking profi t. This placed the local state in an ever more difficult position, first expressed in an internal confl ict between a newly introduced planning department stressing the legitimacy issue and a department of public works trying to maintain co-ordination. Finally, it was also externalised to the rest of the historical bloc when Antwerp lost its fi nancial autonomy and thus all its leverage to reconcile the claims of the citizenry and its private partners.
Exploring Counter-discourses: Experimental Phase, 1983-90
In the same year (1983), the new 'Flemish regional government' that developed from Belgian decentralisation set up an 'urban renewal' programme under pressure from a European-wide campaign led by the then Dutch presidency. Money was provided from the regional level for the-mainly physical -renewal of deprived urban areas. Antwerp grabbed the chance for a new Antwerpen, 1989) . The Flemish programme had drawn much of its inspiration from the 1970s experiments of the Antwerp planning department, which took the opportunity fi nally to realise its ideas. The Antwerp urban planning discourse had remained marginal in the 1970s but now gained prominence in Antwerp urban development circles-not just because of Flemish funding, but also because former alderman for spatial planning Bob Cools was elected mayor in 1983. This new offi cial discourse drew from the popular critique of modernism, but it retained the modernists' main social considerations (the eradication of slum housing). Key elements of the now-offi cial problem defi nition were:
-First of all, there was the 'urban fl ight' of higher-income groups to the suburbs, which had contributed to the near bankruptcy of the city, but also to a growing segregation between rich and poor.
-Secondly, there was the dilapidated housing stock in which predominantly poor people were still residing; about 10% of the housing stock was below the standards of that time.
-On top of that came a neglect of the living environment in urban cities, which had been under pressure of road building, industry and offi ce development. There was a lack of public transport, public space and green areas and too much traffi c, pollution and waste in the streets.
-Finally, the participation of the population in the development of planning has become an important consideration (Stad Antwerpen, 1985) .
The urban renewal programme, co-ordinated by the city's planning department, succeeded in providing ambitious redevelopment plans for 15 areas in the 19th century city. It promised to increase the 'liveability' of these areas for its residents through small measures. It involved the renewal-and often pedestrianisation-of the public domain and the renovation of dilapidated housing. Most of the reconstructed housing consisted of either self-renovation by owner-occupiers or turning private residual rental housing into social rental housing. Citizen participation in the development of plans became a central feature of the programme. The planning service worked together with the local university's sociology department to gain an overview of the city's social and housing situation, and engaged the Regional Institute for Community Development (Regionaal Instituut voor Samenlevingsopbouw, hereafter RISO) to organise citizen participation.
The actual execution of the plans was carried out by the department for public works and the social housing companies, under the co-ordination of the urban planning department and the residents, who had to organise themselves as a 'steering committee' . While internal co-ordination was enhanced, there was little or no interaction with organisations and actors outside the formal state apparatus. The private real-estate sector was intentionally excluded. 'Liveability' had to be stimulated for the original residents and therefore displacement was to be avoided. Bearing in mind the major tabula rasa operations in earlier decades, real-estate companies were suspected of disregarding this consideration. Not that they were that interested in participating: after demand in the offi ce sector had gone down in the early 1980s, they had just discovered the potentials of upmarket housing development, notably on the Antwerp waterfront alongside the River Scheldt, with its abandoned 19th century warehouses, and in 'Zuid', the late 19th-century bourgeois area south of the centre. Development started slowly in Zuid after new museums and cultural infrastructure had been established there in the late 1980s and gradually expanded northwards along the waterfront. Individual gentrification pioneers had already settled in the area in previous years and profi t rates there were much higher than in the slum areas designated for the renewal programme. In the medieval centre, 1970s individual pioneers were increasingly replaced by a rapidly expanding tourism and leisure infrastructure, turning the area into a theme park full of cafés, restaurants, fashion boutiques and antique shops (Verhetsel and Ceulemans, 1994; Timmerman, 1994) .
With the advent of a new government in Flanders six years later, the urban renewal programme was phased out. Considering the virtual absence of private investors as one of the programme's greatest fl aws, the Flemish government sought to promote urban development through public-private partnerships instead (de Decker, 1994a) .
In Antwerp, this renewed focus on the coordination problem equally failed. Inspired by a growing activity at the Antwerp waterfront, a group of urban planners, architects and private investors tried to re-establish a common and unifying approach to waterfront development. In 1989, 'Stad-aan-de-Stroom' (SAS or City at the Stream) was set up as a quango, supported by the municipal and the Flemish government. It drew a budget from both public and private sources in order to develop 'visions' for qualitative urban development. SAS departed from a 'harmonious vision' on urban development (Timmerman, 1994) . It believed that 'qualitative environments' would convince both investors and the local population. Soon SAS would experience the utopianism of this hope. Project developers-at the time, mainly construction companies looking for quick gains 1 -were unwilling to let their investment decisions be co-ordinated by the SAS vision, choosing quick profit instead of the promised sustainable collective benefi ts. Moreover, citizen participation was not very high on the agenda. It was limited to a series of 'preliminary hearings' at the beginning of the project and no solutions were offered to the 19th-century working-class areas where needs were more pressing, making SAS a somewhat élite endeavour (Stad aan de Stroom, 1990) . Consequently, SAS quickly lost legitimacy both with the wider public and with local government. Internal and external frictions over concrete projects caused the group to dismantle in 1994 (de Decker, 1994b) . Capital would continue its own path of urban regeneration in the most profi table areas, separate and divergent from state or bottomup initiatives.
In this fi rst, experimental phase of nonhegemony, it is interesting how counterhegemonic discourses and previously marginal organisations like the planning department gain more prominence. With the former hegemony scattered, the local state starts a frenetic search for a new hegemonic discourse, which opened up opportunities for these more alternative voices. The urban renewal programme is an attempt by the local state to seek renewed legitimacy by incorporating counter-hegemonic discourses, but it neglected the co-ordination issue and was unable to enforce a coherent, city-wide urban development coalition. SAS, on the other hand, did show awareness of the coordination problem, but it did not succeed in orienting investments in a direction which might also take into account the issue of liveability in deprived urban neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, the failed experiences of SAS and urban renewal inspired the establishment of a more coherent and sustained hegemonic project in the next phase. Analyses showed how the Vlaams Blok electorate at the time was dominated by less educated, White, poor and working-class urbanites from deprived 19th-century neighbourhoods and most political analysts sustained the view that the White urban poor had grabbed the Vlaams Blok as a lever to ask for attention to the problems they experienced with the infl ux of foreign immigrants in their neighbourhoods and to express their more general political alienation. As the party's electoral basis continued to grow, the questions the Vlaams Blok had been putting up at that time (immigration and unsafety) became strong factors in the discourse on cities and prompted a new interpretation of 'liveability' in 19th-century inner-city neighbourhoods (see Loopmans et al., 2003; de Decker et al., 2005) . The predominantly 'physical' approach to urban renewal in the 1980s was now deemed too restricted to establish 'liveability' in general. Indeed, similar signals had already been received in the hearings during the urban renewal participation process and earlier (Stad Antwerpen, 1978) . Citizens had voiced their discontent over both the growing ethnic diversity in their neighbourhoods for disrupting established patterns of social cohesion and over the individuality and incivility in contemporary urban life. However, as these were considered 'social problems' , they had not been 'upgraded' to urgent needs within an urban planning logic (Stad Antwerpen, 1978 , 1985 . The continued neglect of this 'social' pillar of urban renewal by the planning department suggested the need for a new approach and necessitated another recentring of the institutional focus within urban policy.
A Hegemonic Project Gaining
In a direct response to the political situation in Antwerp (de Decker, 1999; Loopmans et al., 2003) , the Flemish government set up a programme for local actions against poverty and social exclusion (Flemish Fund for the integration of deprived people-VFIK) next to and apart from the urban renewal programme which petered out.
In Antwerp, the birth of this fund has been taken as a chance to redirect urban development from physical to more social aspects. In 1990, a new public-private body was set up (neighbourhood development company or BOM), a collaboration among the planning and social policy departments of the city of Antwerp, the city's Public Centre for Social Welfare (Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn, hereafter OCMW), the sociology department of the University of Antwerp and the community development NGO RISO. The BOM drew funding from various sources (among them, the EU's Third Poverty Programme and URBAN Pilot projects) and focused on highly visual, 'strategic impulse' projects. It included physical renewal, but integrated with economic development projects (attracting new fi rms to deprived inner-city areas) and social development in one integrated area development project (Moulaert, 2000, pp. 97-101) .
At the federal level, a 'safety fund' had been developed in 1992 in order to tackle unsafety in city neighbourhoods (de Decker et al., 2005) . The safety funds considerably increased the means for local policing, but would later on move more into the sphere of urban development. However, so far, safety remained beyond the limit of the BOM and urban development initiatives in Antwerp and there was little co-ordination between safety contracts and urban development. The Flemish social exclusion fund VFIK evolved, under the infl uence of the BOM example, into the social impulse fund (SIF) (van Hove 2001; de Coninck and Vandenberghe, 1996) . The SIF wanted to broaden the exclusive focus on poverty of the previous funds and reconnect it to the physical approach of the urban renewal programme and to questions of economic development in an integrated approach. Nonetheless, the SIF retained a strong social focus, through a mandatory priority for the most deprived areas and a focus on social exclusion; in Antwerp, the economic and physical development element even diminished compared with the period when the BOM received EU funding. Since 1995, a new organisation, the Urban Development Corporation Antwerp (Stads Ontwikkelings Maatschappij Antwerpen, hereafter SOMA) has co-ordinated the means for urban development derived from higher-level authorities. SOMA, another quango, is firmly under control of the Alderman for Social Affairs (Christiaens et al., 2007) . The planning department became even more peripheral in this phase, as was the social housing sector. Again, the aim was enhancing 'liveability', but now, liveability focuses more strongly on social aspects instead of physical. Liveability would be pursued more through 'teaching people how to live together in diversity' and to decrease the social exclusion of the poor. One very successful programme within the sphere of 'social liveability' was 'Opsinjoren' (Loopmans, 2006b) , which aimed at deploying willingly active residents in the struggle for 'liveability' in streets and neighbourhoods (for instance, by planting fl owers, keeping the streets clean and organising street parties) in tight collaboration with the municipal services.
After the failure of the urban renewal programme, Opsinjoren and its spin-off activities gave a new boost to citizen participation. It successfully established fi rm links between local politicians, specifi c local service departments (especially the sanitation department and the local police) and (mostly White, native Belgian, upper working or middle class) resident organisations (Loopmans, 2007) . As politicians were eager to close 'the gap' between citizens and politics that had been revealed by the success of protest votes, the development of these relations increased the voice and legitimacy of 'active' residents in particular (Loopmans, 2006b) .
The SIF approach, like the urban renewal policy before it, focused in the fi rst instance on the legitimacy issue. Although increasingly recognising the need to co-ordinate public and private investments in the urban environment, neither BOM nor SIF succeeded in providing adequate leverage for luring in the private real-estate sector. Leading policymakers in Antwerp claimed that the priority for social policies in the most deprived-and thus high (investment) risk areas-deterred private investment by property developers (Boudry et al., 1999) . Instead, after a short dip in the early 1990s, residential gentrifi cation boosted again in the second half of the 1990s and the sector regained attention for housing development in the more marketable areas around the waterfront and the medieval core. Instead of individual gentrifi cation pioneers and construction companies, more integrated property developers who specialised in waterfront development were now taking the lead, turning derelict warehouses and bourgeois mansions into large loft projects which attracted mainly older, but wealthy, residents. In the medieval centre, commercial gentrifi cation expanded further, mainly driven by the boom in the fashion industries; various streets were turned into new shopping districts dominated by fashion stores.
Zuid in particular experienced rapid development in the 1990s, moving from a position in the top 10 of Antwerp neighbourhoods with the lowest taxable income in 1991 to one of the highest taxable incomes in 2001. The area has become the home of many galleries, architectural fi rms, designer studios and advertising agencies (Hoefnagels, 2004) . The small amount of interaction between SIF and gentrifi cation areas consisted of displacement of lower-income groups from gentrifying areas-enjoying private investment -to the most deprived areas-enjoying public investment via SIF (de Maesschalck and Loopmans, 2002; Lauwers, 2008) .
Longing for the Middle Classes: Gentrifi cation Policy Phase, 2003-present
The present phase of urban development discourse started after yet another, even more overwhelming, electoral victory by the extreme right. Although the public debate has moved on from the original caricature of the bitter urban poor voting for the Vlaams Blok, the Vlaams Blok electorate is still dominated by White less educated workingclass voters. The party's electoral rise can be explained primarily by geographical expansion, spreading fi rst to the inner ring of early 20th-century working-class suburbs and then also to the more wealthy suburban districts, even beyond the city borders (de Maesschalck and Loopmans, 2003; Billiet and de Witte, 2001 ). Schuermans and de Maesschalck (2007) show how, since 1999, support for the party has been growing much faster in suburban and rural municipalities than in inner-city districts. A 'coalition of the last chance' was set up in 2000, incorporating all parties of the political spectrum apart from the extreme right. Its governing has been marked by an acute sense of urgency as the extreme right came very close to holding an absolute majority of votes. Hence pressure was even higher to take new initiatives.
Before these elections, autochthonous upper-working and middle-class active residents groups that gained more legitimacy under SIF had already been bringing up -with ever more assertiveness-'safety questions' , such as street prostitution, drug dealing, rack-renting, illegal dumping and the presence of illegal immigrants, which the social approach of the SIF had not been able to tackle (Bewonersgroepencongres, 1997; Stad Antwerpen and Gazet van Antwerpen, 1998) . The political situation after 2000 made it hard to neglect further these claims and yet another approach to urban development had to be invented. Simultaneously, private real-estate investors started to lobby for more state support. As the redevelopment of the waterfront and the medieval core reached its conclusion, they began to explore areas where profit was less guaranteed, such as Antwerp-North, the Haussmannised zone along the former medieval city walls linking the 19th-century working-class areas in the north-east to the city centre or the severely rundown red-light district Schipperskwartier on the Scheldt river to the north of the medieval core (Lauwers, 2008) .
The political sense of urgency provided the background to address both claims at the same time, as again, a round of discursive reinvention and intense institutional re-organisation at both the Flemish and the local levels was deemed necessary to curb the electoral crisis (Stad Antwerpen, 2001 ). Under local pressure, a new, more entrepreneurial City Fund replaced the SIF in 2003. The SIF was criticised for its social focus, not providing any leverage for collaboration with economic actors and focusing too much on the poor. It had largely neglected the middle classes and the potential for urban renewal that lies enclosed in their aspirations for gentrifi cation. Moreover, the SIF had failed in its underlying rationale: to undermine the electoral base of the extreme right. With the new City Fund, a new urban policy discourse could be constructed, focusing on 'opportunities' instead of 'problems'. 'Liveability'-which remained the core conceptwas now equated with "a safe, attractive and vibrant urban environment" to be measured by its "attractiveness to higher-income groups" (Loopmans, 2007) .
In Antwerp, supervision of the urban development budget was taken away from the Social Affairs Alderman and returned to the Alderman for Urban Development and Planning. The city's 'planning cell' was reinforced with young and creative professionals (Christiaens et al., 2007) and two new institutions were established. On the one hand, there is the semi-autonomous Real Estate and Urban Development Company Antwerp (Vastgoed-En Stadsontwikkelings bedrijf Antwerpen, hereafter VESPA), which took over the task of co-ordinating urban development programmes from SOMA in an explicit attempt to obtain closer collaboration with private real-estate agents operating in the city (for instance, by drawing some of its employees directly from private real-estate companies). On the other hand, there is a new cell for 'Integral Security' , under the equally new Alderman for Integral Security, which should work on the social aspects of urban development, but from a more 'policing' instead of 'caring' perspective and largely funded by the federal safety funds.
These new structures, under the pressure of an ever more tilting electoral power balance, succeed in responding to both local resident groups' claims for 'liveability' and the quest of private investors for 'profi table opportunities' for housing investment. Uncivil behaviour lying at the basis of 'liveability' in its current sense, is now tackled more with repression instead of care. The Integral Security cell, together with a more community-oriented local police and sanitation department, take on an increasingly proactive approach towards street and window prostitutes, drug addicts and illegal immigrants subject to rackrenting in slum housing (Stad Antwerpen, 2005) . Where deemed necessary, they are driven off the streets and eliminated from the neighbourhood, to be "replaced by better people", as the Alderman for Integral Security bluntly stated in a public hearing in AntwerpNorth, if necessary by force the municipality is willing to provide for more security measures where real estate actors demand this as a condition before investing in Antwerp North ... It must be possible to send out more police forces in the neighbourhood to meet the demands of security from project developers (Gazet van .
Very little protest was pitched against these statements; instead, the dominant network of (White, mostly middle-class) active local residents in Antwerp North proclaimed that they were eagerly waiting for a more 'liveable' neighbourhood. Citing Zuid as the desitable neighbourhood type, they made no secret of their wishes to replace more marginalised groups by middle-class gentrifi ers (de Bilzen, 2002; 2 . A kind of liveability now prevails which market parties, according to the Alderman, were merely waiting to providein collaboration with the city. Liveability, in a somewhat revanchist guise, fi nally succeeds in providing a coherent framework for all actors involved in urban development. Moreover, through VESPA, the city of Antwerp has fi nally found a vehicle to re-establish itself as an active and leading investor, combining the co-ordination of major supralocal urban policy funds with the tasks of valorising the city's own unused patrimony (more than 900 buildings in the portfolio, often at strategic locations, for an estimated value of 113 million euro; in addition VESPA lets out about 1400 units in 2006), of developing its own building and renovation projects (155 buildings in its 2006 portfolio, 62 more being realised), and of organising major publicprivate partnership projects (30 major projects, affecting a whole building block, in 2006) (AG VESPA, 2007) .
The power to co-ordinate is revealed by the increasing number of building projects with which the city is willing and able to identify itself; again, as in the modernist period, public and private sectors are investing in the same areas, if not in the same projects: one of the main instruments the city uses today for urban development is the 'building block project' where a whole building block is being readjusted and revalorised in collaboration with the various public and private landowners (Pittillion et al., 2005) . The renewed focus on construction in urban policy has not gone unnoticed by the wider public, as is revealed by the current mayor Patrick Janssens' local nickname 'the brick mayor' .
His approach is successfully legitimised with the promise of more liveable neighbourhoods born with the arrival of 'better' residents. In his electoral campaign for the municipal elections of 2006, mayor Janssens put a lot of emphasis on his 'grands travaux' for the city and how these have made Antwerp a more pleasant place to live in-in addition to several complimentary articles through the more regular channels of newspapers and lifestyle magazines, both mayor and vice-mayor have published a series of books about their 'realisations' (Janssens, 2005 (Janssens, , 2006 van Campenhout, 2006) -and the local 'new urban' jet-set of pop icons, artists and media-characters overtly supported him in a poster campaign. It turned out to be a good strategy: previously, the Vlaams Belang had been able to set the terms of the campaign. In 2006, the party's leader Filip Dewinter tried to incorporate Janssens' major urban development projects as 'urban diamonds' into his own electoral strategy and explicitly supported the mayor's policy of attracting (White) middle-class residents, proclaiming it not just a socioeconomic, but also an ethnic reconquest of the central city (Dewinter, 2006) . It was mainly Janssens who profi ted electorally from this new discourse: for the first time in 30 years, the main opposition party Vlaams Belang did not make any electoral progress in the city (a rising percentage of votes in the peripheral districts of the pre-and post-war suburbs was offset by a loss in the 19th-century belt), whereas mayor Janssens' own social-democrats increased their share of the votes by more than 15 per cent to over 35 per cent, a result which his party had not been able to reach since 1976. So far, few studies have been published on the 2006 local elections, but preliminary research notes have pointed out two important phenomena. First, easier access to Belgian nationality and access to municipal elections for non-nationals have increased the electorate of foreign origin, which, obviously, has negatively affected the results of the Vlaams Blok in the 19th-century districts where residents of foreign origin are well represented (Hertogen, 2006) . Secondly, Janssens' personal campaign has had a strong positive impact on the social-democrat party results. Focusing on the young urban professionals he has been so keen to attract to the city and who also predominantly settled in the 19th-century area (replacing an older working-class population), Janssens succeeded in drawing voters away from other more traditional 'gentrifi er parties' like the greens (Groen!) and the liberals (VLD) (van Aelst et al., 2006) .
While it may be too early to speak of an established hegemony, it is clear that the latest hegemonic project deploying the concept of state-supported gentrification has the best chances of developing into hegemony since the modernist project. This project is furthered now by strongly professionalised real-estate developers (mostly local companies which have been merged or integrated with multinational real-estate actors), a polity focused on and experienced in physical urban development (headed by VESPA and major Janssens) and the activist part of the population-i.e. the hundreds of upperworking-class and middle-class resident committees-mobilised for a more liveable city. Gentrifi cation has become the key word to co-ordinate both public and private investment activities in the city and is strongly supported by the wider public, as is revealed not only by the relative lack of organised protest (even Vlaams Belang supports the planning department was the fi rst to come up with a renewed approach to urban policy. However, the incorporation of grassroots claims in their discourse prevented a renewed collaboration with the private sector and, as they largely neglected the social dimensions of the liveability problem, legitimacy was soon lost as well. In their wake, new organisations developed equally aspiring for a more central position. SAS, which focused on the co-ordination issue, did not live long. However, the BOM-SOMA approach, under the auspices of the Social Affairs Alderman succeeded in taking up a more established position. Liveability is now interpreted in a more integrated manner, focusing on the social dimensions too, and this approach lives up more to the demands of the participating residents. Yet focusing on the most deprived areas and populations, it fails to lure in the private sector and obtain a co-ordinating role. Consequently, visible results are meagre. As the growing safety concerns voiced by active residents and the Vlaams Blok are equally ignored, the programme steadily loses its legitimacy as well.
In a fi nal phase, VESPA appears as a new key organisation. Focusing on gentrifi cation (framed as the attraction of 'better' residents to the city) as a more durable solution to the multidimensional problem of liveability and concentrating purposively on the more opportunity-rich areas with depreciated, but valuable 19th-century bourgeois mansions and warehouses, such as the Haussmannised zone bordering the more deprived, homogeneous working-class areas, it succeeds in re-establishing a common ground with the private real-estate sector and acts as the coordinating organisation for all urban development activities. With safety now also taken serious as a policy issue, connected to the goal of gentrification, and with the enhanced liveability of already-gentrified areas acting as a lure for aspiring residents in other road taken), but equally by the spectacularly strong electoral support for the mayor and his party in the latest elections.
Conclusion
Analysing the development of state-supported gentrification in Antwerp from a neoGramscian perspective reveals how these policies are intensely connected to local political and social struggles and shows how the sequence of policy shifts culminating in the present gentrifi cation policies can be regarded as reactions to problems of legitimacy and co-ordination in the fi eld of urban policies. In Antwerp, the history of gentrifi cation as a hegemonic project can be traced back to the crisis of modernist hegemony in urban development (Table 1) . This crisis revealed itself fi rst in a decreasing legitimacy for the major urban renewal projects that it spawned, in particular in the inner cities. Instead, activists from various stances (conservationists protesting against the destruction of historical monuments, feminists reclaiming public space for children instead of cars, inner-city shopkeepers bemoaning the loss of local residents as clients and progressive intellectuals and artists aiming to revamp the creative underground spirit of the city) came up with a new alternative discourse focusing on the 'liveability' of the city and reclaiming the city for the residential function. Whereas it troubled the coalition between state and private-sector construction companies (which was given the fi nal blow by the 1970s economic crisis), a true counter-hegemony was not established.
Instead, parts of the 'liveability' discourse have been incorporated in ensuing attempts to re-establish hegemony. Almost immediately, new organisations on the fringes of the city's bureaucracy set themselves up as the central brokers of a new hegemonic project. In an experimental phase, the newly developed A neo-Gramscian analysis of this kind does not only help us to reach a better understanding of the current relation between public policy and gentrifi cation in Antwerp, it also provides valuable strategic insights for scholars seeking to deploy spaces of relevance. In particular, Gramsci's writings on the strategic dimensions of hegemonic struggles can be of interest. First of all, this approach suggests not to look for generic strategies to enhance policy relevance, but to take into account the local social and political context; even though studies suggest that gentrifi cation policies are on the rise world-wide, this does not mean that they all occur under similar social and political conditions. Rotterdam, for instance, reveals a similar path towards gentrifi cation policies. However, the impetus in Antwerp for hegemonic struggle has been much more the legitimacy issue, whereas in Rotterdam, with a stronger bureaucracy, coordination problems have played a stronger role in driving the search for a new hegemony (Uitermark et al., 2007; Beaumont and Loopmans, 2008) . Hence other fi elds will need to be explored to increase relevance.
In particular, it has been suggested taking into account whether or not a hegemonic situation exists; it is not a given that gentrifi cation policies will underpin a local hegemony everywhere. It is likely that these strategies will not fi nd such strong legitimacy amongst the population or that they will not always enhance co-ordination within the governance network. If indeed a local hegemony is the condition we are working in, as it appears to be in Antwerp, we might take Gramsci's warning seriously that a head-on war of manoeuvres, approaching key policy-makers with highly critical ideas about the policy choices they have made, is not the proper approach for the moment. The story presented here has revealed how, at certain moments in non-hegemonic times, critical scholars have been able directly to 'whisper in the mayor's ear': desperately seeking for a new hegemonic project, policy-makers were indeed relatively receptive to the advice of the highly critical planning department or to the analyses of the BOM-partners in the non-hegemonic 1980s and 1990s. However, the operational success of and the widespread electoral support for the current gentrification approach puts policy-makers in a more comfortable position with little pressure to seek out new policy formulas and hence such openness to criticism cannot be expected today.
Therefore, Gramsci's writings suggest, it might be more wise to engage in a 'war of position', trying to strengthen those social groups that are disaffected by the policies. Indeed, in Antwerp, signals exist that very diverse social groups are negatively affected, in different ways, by these policies, but their protests remain highly fragmented and go largely unnoticed. These are not confi ned to the most evident victims, those who are being displaced or see their choice in the housing market further restricted to ever-lower-quality housing for an ever-increasing price. They might for instance be linked to conservationist groups, who are increasingly critical of the fact that gentrifi cation often entails newbuilt development in valuable historical parts of the city. There is a lot of work to do for gentrifi cation researchers in empowering various groups. Today, few of these groups produce a coherent story within which to frame their discontent and gentrification students can do a lot here by providing welldeveloped analyses of the interrelations between their disparate experiences and the process of state-supported gentrifi cation; such analyses might strengthen their claims and help them to build-perhaps unexpectedcoalitions which might severely undercut the legitimacy of gentrifi cation policies as they are today. Of course, this is not just a matter of dissemination of results but equally involves strategically choosing subjects of study which might provide powerful discursive weapons for those groups rejecting gentrifi cation as a solution to their problems.
Yet critical students of gentrifi cation need not stop there. Apart from unsettling the legitimacy of gentrifi cation, there is a lot of work to do on the co-ordination side as well. Today, the co-ordination power of the gentrifi cation discourse rests with the belief that gentrifi cation policies could bring profi table and liveable neighbourhoods everywhere, for everyone. Critical analyses of this belief might increase insight into who benefits from the policies and who does not and will possibly reveal unfounded optimism from the side of some of the partners involved and decrease their willingness to collaborate.
Finally, apart from undermining the legitimacy and co-ordinating power of current gentrifi cation policies, the even more important job of constructing a more viable alternative remains: to imagine and develop new vibrant urban policy scenarios which might draw the necessary public support and enable the suffi ciently strong enough co-ordination of core organisations to constitute an alternative hegemony, without pro-ducing the negative social externalities and inequalities so often caused by gentrification. This might well prove the most challenging task lying ahead of us.
Notes
1. Remark made by Jef van den Broeck, spatial planner and former SAS member. 2. A sole exception was Basta!, a committee dominated by working-class political activists pleading against all forms of nuisance but rejecting the gentrifi cation road as they feared displacement (see Loopmans, 2006) .
